Abstract: Deniable authentication protocol plays an important role in some special application. This study presents a non-interactive deniable authentication protocol based on ECC the security and performance based on ECDLP. Our proposed non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is against with security analysis; the protocol can resist forgery attack, replay attack, known session key attack and impersonation attack and has security and lower computing complexity. This paper also proves deniability with automatic formal tool CryptoVerif.
Introduction
Deniable authentication protocol is a special authentication protocol which the receiver can affirm the source of the message, at the same time, the receiver cannot give proof about the source of the message to the third party. These specialties are valuable for some particular applications, such as electronic voting, the voter expects the Ballot-Counting-Center has the right to verify him, but doesn't hope the center prove the relationship between his identity and vote to other people. The deniable authentication protocol can correspond to the requirements.
In the last several decades, many researchers have concentrated on interactive deniable authentication protocols, which mainly consist of two stages: key agreement stage and message transmission stage. Generally several messages are exchanged in each run. Thus the interactive deniable authentication protocols are not efficient. Hence from about 2004, people pay a serious attention on non-interactive deniable authentication protocols those generally exchange one message in each run and are efficient.
In this field, Shao [1] presents the first non-interactive deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal signature scheme. After that, Lee et al. [2] improve Shao's protocol and propose a new non-interactive protocol which can be against share-key attack. At the same time, other non-interactive authentication protocols have come forth one after another, which based on different cryptography theories, such as RSA [3, 4] , ElGamal [1, 2, 5] and so on, those schemes, which based on factorization, require much memory and a powerful computing ability, and that, the schemes based on discrete logarithm need exponent arithmetic which may take a longer time than other operations. In order to improve the security and efficiency, this paper proposes a non-interactive deniable authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem that can enhance the security and efficiency. Finally the deniability is proved in formal method by automatic tool CryptoVerif.
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Preliminary
ECC (Elliptic curve cryptography) is a public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. The security of ECC depends on the ability to compute a point multiplication and the inability to compute the multiplicand given the original and product points, which is called elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [6] . 
Definition 1: EC

Definition 2: ECDLP (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem)
In an Abelian group ( , ) , k < p , it is easy computing Q from k and P ,but computing k by P , Q is hard.
At the present time, the least time solving ECDLP is more than the time spending on solving normal discrete logarithm problem [7] .
Definition 3: EC point check
, if sufficient conditions below are satisfactory, then
3) Q is one point in one special EC in form of (1).
The Proposed Protocol
We assume the sender and the receiver have synchronized the time before execution of the protocol. In our scheme, the sender has two pairs of keys, one is long-term and another is short-term or temporary, and so is the receiver. The long-term key pair is generated by CA (Certificate Authority), it will be in effect for a long time, and in contrast, the temporary key is different from each other in every session, so it is generated by both sides of one session. 
, is the session key generated by Receiver and it should correspond to K if the both sides is communicating actually. B can also compute one authentication by ( ' || || ) H K M t and then verify whether it equals to MAC received from sender or not, if yes, B accepts the message and authenticates the identification of the sender being A, if not B will reject the message. The procedure of the protocol is described simply in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 The proposed scheme.
Analysis
Completeness
If Sender A and Receiver B communicated in accord with above steps in this protocol, we could draw the conclusion that B can definite the source of the accepted message because of Equation (2), here, un-considering the existing of adversary. 
Due to the session key is only shared by A and B, and if formula ( ' || || )
is true, the message came from A absolutely.
Analysis of security
Resistible of forgery attack
Even if the adversary intercepts the message sent by Sender A, due to the guarantee of ECDLP the adversary cannot obtain the random number A r generated by A and the private key A sk of A, or the private key B sk of B, the information which are useful for the adversary to compute session key. So the authentication he has computed can't be affirmed by the Receiver B.
Resistible of replay attack
The parameter t in proposed protocol is useful for application, with it, and in one circumstance where the time of sender and that receiver are of synchronization. Qua a time stamp t can denote the effective period of the message since generating moment of message, the duration of the effective period is dynamic. So that the receiver can check the time stamp of the message and decide accept it or reject. The time stamp t is also authenticated like as data M , the adversary can't make modification according to security property which is resistible of forgery attack.
Resistible of known session key attack
Even though the session key leaks and adversary gets it, the adversary cannot use the session key again, because the key corresponds to the data sent by the honest sender who computes parameter , rather than the known session key. Therefore the known session key is affectless except knowing of more secure information.
Resistible of impersonation attack
In this context, for example, the private key of Sender has leaked, the adversary hopes to impersonate the corresponding receiver B who communicates with A, at the same time, the private key of B doesn't leak, it is produced by CA and others cannot access it, this can guarantee the adversary doesn't know the private key of B. so that A will not acknowledge it. The impersonation fails.
Analysis of deniability
According to Equation (2),the receiver B can compute session ' K which equal to K ,so that B can generate the authentication of data sent by sender A and is denoted by ' MAC , which is also verifiable, in other words, with the matter one authentication is verified successfully, others couldn't ensure the authentication produced by A or B. This is deniability of proposed protocol.
The automatic formal proof of deniability with CryptoVerif
Heretofore, the proof of deniability was artificial and it is error-prone, here we prove the deniability of proposed protocol by an automatic formal tool called CryptoVerif which is presented [9] . query x:value, y:randomseed; event PortionReceiver(Receiver,y) ==> WholeSender(Sender,x) . query x:value, y:randomseed; event WholeThirdParty(ThirdParty,x)==>WholeReceiver(Receiver,y). query event P (3) (4) ortionThirdParty==>true .
(5) Figure 2 The code of deniability.
The formalization of deniability is shown in Fig. 2 . If they can be proved , we say the protocol has deniability, Equation (3) expresses if event PortionReceiver(Receiver, y) occurs, before this event there must be exist one eventWholeSender(Sender,x) which has occurred, this correspondence is used as the matter that receiver authenticates sender, similarly, Equation (4) denotes the matter that third-party authenticates receiver, Equation (5) is just used for proving one acting point of the program is reachable and more details are in Fig. 6 , and these three formulas are sufficient to prove the deniability.
The main process is responsible for initialization of proposed protocol, in this process; the constant and relevant information in the following communications is produced, such as the long-term key pairs of Sender A(i.e. _ , _ sk A pk A) and receiver B(i.e. _ , _ sk B pk B ), the basic point P. If all these operations have been accomplished, the main process will start the sender, receiver and the third-party process by The symbol ' |' denotes paralleling, and !N represents N copies of the process will be executing, and more details are in Fig. 3(a) , the key pair (sk_T, pk_T) is used for transporting encryption of session-key from receiver to third-party.
In a session that runs as expected, the sender process starts firstly when accepts any one message on channel c1 .According to the procedure of proposed protocol, the sender process chooses one data m_A ,then generates parameters ,time stamp t_A and R_A ,then computes the session key K_A and authentication Mac_A , after that, the sender process sends R_A, m_A, Mac_A,t_A to Receiver process.
Just as the code in Fig. 3(b) , the receiver process. Just as the code in Fig. 4 s (pk + pk pk )modp respectively. After the receiver process has received the message sent by the sender process , it takes check(t_B,R_B) as the first action which means checking the validity of time stamp t_B and point R_B receiver process, if success ,according to proposed protocol, the real receiver process has the ability to compute session key K_B which should equal to K_A , just as the code in Fig. 4(a) , in order to simplify the complexity. We use the two symbols of functions f4(sk_B, pk_B) and . At the moment, the receiver can verify whether the source of the authentication is Sender A or not by K_B . Next, the process serves proving the deniability of proposed protocol; it generates another new data m_B_B , and then using session key K_B to compute corresponding authentication Mac_B_B .Ultimately sends (m_B_B, Mac_B_B, t_B, enc_B) to the third-party process, in which the symbol enc_B serves for the encryption of K_B under pk_T .
let ReceiverProcess = in(c2, (=Receiver,con_B:value)); let concat1(R_B:value,m_B:value, Mac_B:value,t_B:value)=con_B in find j2<=N suchthat defined(Mac_A[j2])&&(Mac_B=Mac_A[j2]) then if check(t_B,R_B) then let s_B=f4(sk_B,pk_B) in let K_B : value = f5(s_B,H(m_B),R_B,pk_A) in if H(concat(K_B,m_B,t_B))=Mac_B then new r5 :randomseed; event PortionReceiver(Receiver,r5); new m_B_B:value; new t_B_B:value; let Mac_B_B=H(concat(K_B,m_B_B,t_B)) in event WholeReceiver(Receiver,r5); let enc_B:cipher=enc(K_B, pk_T, r5) in out(c5, (ThirdParty, concat2 (m_B_B, Mac_B_B, t_B, enc_B))). As the description in Fig. 4(b) , the third-party process verifies the authentication once it received the message sent by A, and also confirms the source of the authentication, && find j2 <= N suchthat defined (K_A[j2] ) (K_T = K_A[j2]) then serves for describing the capability of the receiver which can generate verifiable authentication with the same session with sender. If this action succeeds, that is to say the protocol has deniability. Because the third party could not confirm who generate the authentication.
The result of the proof of proposed protocol using CryptoVerif appears in Fig. 5 , it is manifest that the result is satisfactory the requirement in Fig. 2 , so the deniability is effective. Figure 5 The result of cryptoverif. [2] and proposed protocol in security field and performance field. We can make the conclusion that proposed protocol has better security and lower computation complexity than these schemes. 
Analysis of performance
Summary
Deniable authentication protocol plays an important role in some special application. In this study we present a non-interactive deniable authentication protocol based on ECC the security and performance are based on ECDLP. Our proposed non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is against with security analysis; the protocol can resist forgery attack, replay attack, known session key attack and impersonation attack and has security and lower computing complexity. We also prove deniability with automatic formal tool CryptoVerif. The future work is to reduce the size of data transmission with current advantages. Structure
